This paper presents three methods for strengthening public key cryptosystems in such a w ay that they become secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. In an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack, an attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts, except for the exact object ciphertext to becryptanalyzed. The rst strengthening method is based on the use of one-way hash functions, the second on the use of universal hash functions and the third on the use of digital signature schemes. Each method is illustrated by an example of a public key cryptosystem based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. Security of the three example cryptosystems is formally proved. Two other issues, namely applications of the methods to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems and enhancement of information authentication capability to the cryptosystems, are also discussed.
Introduction
A considerable amount of research has been done in recent y ears, both from the theoretical 1, 2 , 3, 4] and practical 5] points of view, in the pursuit of the construction of public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In such an attack, the attacker (cryptanalyst) has access to the deciphering algorithm of a cryptosystem. The attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts, obtain the 1 Preprint 2/92. Also in the Special Issue on Secure Communications, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol.11, No.5, pp.715-724, 1993 . Preliminary results were reported in \Practical approaches to attaining security against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (extended abstract)," Crypto'92, Santa Barbara, August 1992. 2 Supported in part by the Australian Research Council under the reference numbers A49030136, A49130102 and A49131885. matching plaintexts and use the attained knowledge in the cryptanalysis of an object ciphertext.
The theoretical results are appealing in that the schemes which embody them are provably secure under certain assumptions. However, most of these schemes are impractical due to the large expansion of the resulting ciphertext. The recent and notable schemes by Damg ard overcome the problem of impracticality, but they are totally insecure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks in which an attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm even after he or she is given an object ciphertext to be cryptanalyzed. The attacker is allowed to query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertext, except for the exact object ciphertext.
Adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks would impose serious problems on many services provided by modern information technology. To illustrate the possible attacks, consider the case of a security-enhanced electronic mail system where a public key cryptosystem is used to encipher messages passed among users. Nowadays it is common practice for an electronic mail user to include the original message he or she received into a reply to the message. For instance, a reply to a message may beas follows This practice provides an avenue for chosen ciphertext attacks, as an attacker can send a ciphertext to a target user and expect the user to send back the corresponding plaintext as part of the reply. Now suppose that a user Alice is in the process of negotiating, through the electronic mail system, with two other users Bob and Cathy who are rivals of each other in a business. Let c bea ciphertext from Bob to Alice. Naturally, Cathy would like to know the contents of the communications between Alice and Bob. Cathy can obtain the ciphertext c by eavesdropping. However, it would be infeasible for her to extract its contents immediately. Instead, Cathy m i g h t try to discover implicitly the contents of c through discussions with Alice using the electronic mail. The problem facing Cathy is that she can not simply pass c to Alice with the hope that Alice would include the contents of c into her reply, as Alice would detect that c is actually a ciphertext created by Bob but not by Cathy. Nevertheless, if the cryptosystem is insecure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, Cathy might still be able to obtain indirectly what she wants in the following way 1. Send Alice ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 , : : : , c n , none of which is the same as the object ciphertext c. 2 . Receive the matching plaintext messages (hopefully) and 3. Extract the contents of c by the use of information obtained from the n plaintextciphertext pairs.
In this paper we present three pragmatic methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. The rst method is based on the use of one-way hash functions, the second on the use of universal hash functions and the third on the use of digital signature schemes. Each method is illustrated by a n example of a public key cryptosystem based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. Security of the three cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks is formally proved under reasonable assumptions.
In Section 2, we summarize various types of possible attack to cryptosystems and introduce a formal de nition for security of public key cryptosystems. In Section 3 previous proposals together with their problems are reviewed. Our immunization methods are illustrated in Section 4, by three public key cryptosystems based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. This is followed by an analysis of security of the cryptosystems in Section 5. Section 6 is concerned with two other issues, namely applications of the immunization methods to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems, such as the problem of factoring large composite numbers, and the addition of information authentication capability to the three cryptosystems. Finally Section 7 presents some concluding remarks.
Notion and Notations
We will be concerned with the alphabet = f0 1g. The length of a string x over is denoted by jxj, and the concatenation of two strings x and y is denoted by xjjy.
The bit-wise exclusive-or of two strings x and y of the same length is denoted by x y. The i-th bit of x is denoted by x i and the substring of x from x i to x j , where i < = j, is denoted by x i j] . #S indicates the number of elements in a set S, and x2 R S means choosing randomly and uniformly an element x from the set S. The Cartesian product of two sets S and T is denoted by S T.
Denote by I N the set of all positive i n tegers, and by n a security parameter which determines the length of messages, the length of ciphertexts, the security of cryptosystems etc. As in the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal's public key scheme 6, 7] , p is an n-bit prime and g is a generator for the multiplicative group GF(p) of the nite eld GF(p). Both p and g are public. To guarantee the security of cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem, the length n of p should belarge enough, preferably n > 512, and p ; 1 should contain a large prime factor 8, 9] . Unless otherwise speci ed, all exponentiation operations appearing in the remaining part of this paper are assumed to be over the underlying groups.
Note that there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between strings in n and elements in the nite eld GF(2 n ). Similarly, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between strings in n and integers in 0 2 n ; 1]. Therefore, we will not distinguish among strings in n , elements in GF(2 n ) and integers in 0 2 n ; 1].
A public key cryptosystem, invented by Di e and Hellman 6], consists of three polynomial time algorithms (C E D). C is called a key-generation algorithm which, on input n, generates probabilistically a pair (pk sk) of public and secret keys. Following the tradition in the eld, when a security parameter n is used as input to an algorithm, it will be represented by the all-1 string of n bits which is denoted by 1 n . E is called an enciphering algorithm which, on input a public key pk and a plaintext message m, outputs a ciphertext c. Here m is chosen from a message space M n . D is called a deciphering algorithm which, on input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, outputs a message m or a special symbol meaning \no plaintext output". E and D satisfy the following unique decipherability condition, namely D(sk E(pk m)) = m.
Attacks to Cryptosystems
There are four common types of attack to a cryptosystem, namely ciphertext only attacks, known plaintext attacks, chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks 10]. Related attacks against digital signatures are fully discussed in 11].
In a ciphertext only attack, which is the least severe among the four types of attack, an attacker is given an object ciphertext and tries to nd the plaintext which is hidden in the object ciphertext.
In a known plaintext attack, an attacker has a collection of plaintext-ciphertext pairs besides an object ciphertext. The attacker may u s e the knowledge gained from the pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts in the cryptanalysis of the object ciphertext.
In a c hosen plaintext attack, an attacker has access to the enciphering algorithm. During the cryptanalysis of an object ciphertext, the attacker can choose whatever plaintexts he or she desires, feed the enciphering algorithm with the desired plaintexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. Note that this type of attack is always applicable to a public key cryptosystem, since the attacker always has access to the public enciphering algorithm.
In a chosen ciphertext attack, which is the most severe among the four types of attack, an attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm. The attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts and obtain the corresponding plaintexts. Then the attacker can use the knowledge obtained in the query and answer process to extract the plaintext of an object ciphertext.
Researchers further distinguish two forms of chosen ciphertext attack: indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks and adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. An indi erently chosen ciphertext attack is also called a lunchtime attack or a midnight attack 2]. In such an attack the ciphertexts fed into the deciphering algorithm are chosen without being related to the object ciphertext. However the ciphertexts fed into the deciphering algorithm may becorrelated with one another. This form of attack models the situation where the attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm before he or she is actually given the object ciphertext.
In adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks all ciphertexts fed into the deciphering algorithm can be correlated to the object ciphertext. This form of attack is more severe than the indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks and it models the situation where the attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm even after he or she is given the object ciphertext. The attacker is thus permitted to give the deciphering algorithm any available ciphertexts, except for the exact object ciphertext, and obtain the matching plaintexts. See the Introduction for a practical application where adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks would bea considerable threat.
Notion of Security
Much e ort has beendirected towards formalizing the notion of security of (public) key cryptosystems 12, 13, 14, 3] . To becalled secure, a cryptosystem should ful ll at least the condition that it is infeasible for an attacker to obtain the complete plaintext of an object ciphertext. This requirement for the attacker can be weakened to that of obtaining just partial information of the plaintext. This intuition is well captured by the notion of semantic security, which can be viewed as the polynomially bounded version of Shannon's \perfect secrecy " 15] . Informally, a cryptosystem is semantically secure if whatever can becomputed by an attacker about the plaintext given an object ciphertext, can also be computed without the object ciphertext. Semantic security ensures that no partial information on the plaintext is leaked from an object ciphertext to probabilistic polynomial time bounded attackers.
We can further classify semantic security into the following four kinds according to di erent types of attack. These four kinds of semantic security are (1) semantic security against ciphertext only attacks, (2) semantic security against known plaintext attacks, (3) semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks and (4) semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks, respectively. As this paper is concerned with public key cryptosystems, we will restrict our attention to the later two kinds of semantic security, namely semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks and semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks. In the following, a de nition for semantic security of public key cryptosystems is given in terms of two probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines (algorithms): a collector and a partial information extractor. (See also 2].)
A collector is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm L and it corresponds to the rst stage of cryptanalysis in which an attacker gathers information useful for the next stage. The output of L is a string which can be the entire history of its computation. We are interested in the following three types of collectors:
1. a chosen plaintext collector L cp which has as input only a security parameter n and a public key pk. Note that L cp can always obtain plaintext-ciphertext pairs by the use of the public key pk.
2. an indi erently chosen ciphertext collector L icc which, in addition to n and pk, has access to the deciphering algorithm. The collector can query the deciphering algorithm with polynomially many ciphertexts, obtain answers from the algorithm and use the information in its computation.
3. an adaptively chosen ciphertext collector L acc which has as input n, pk and an object ciphertext. Like an indi erently chosen ciphertext collector L icc , an adaptively chosen ciphertext collector L acc also has access to the deciphering algorithm. L acc can query the deciphering algorithm with polynomially many ciphertexts, except for the exact object ciphertext. The ciphertexts given to the deciphering algorithm can berelated to the object ciphertext to becryptanalyzed.
A partial information extractor is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm T which corresponds to the second stage of cryptanalysis in which a n attacker actually computes information about the plaintext of an object ciphertext. T has n, pk and an object ciphertext as input, and has access to the output of a collector L. The output of T is a string which m a y represent some partial information of the plaintext message obscured in the object ciphertext.
De nition 1 Let (C E D) be a public key cryptosystem, M n = P a message space induced by a security parameter n, where P is a polynomial in n. Assume that a message m is drawn from M n with a probability p(m). Let V be any set and f pk n any function from M n to V , where pk is a public key generated probabilistically by C on input n. Denote by p f pk n the maximum probability with which one could guess the output of the function f pk n without having any idea about its actual input. Note that p f pk n = max v2V f m2pre f pk PrfT (1 n p k c ) = f pk n (m)g < p f pk n + 1 =Q where m is a message chosen from M n with probability p(m), pk a public key generated probabilistically by C on input n and c the ciphertext of m with respect to pk.
An equivalent notion of semantic security is that of polynomial security. A cryptosystem is polynomially secure if no probabilistic polynomial time algorithms can distinguish between the ciphertexts of two plaintext messages m 1 and m 2 . We refer the reader to 13, 14, 2 , 4 ] for a more detailed treatment of the notion of security for cryptosystems. A related notion called non-malleable security was introduced in 3], where an example of non-malleable public key cryptosystems was also demonstrated.
Problems with Previous Proposals
Rabin pioneered the research of constructing provably secure public key cryptosystems by designing a public key cryptosystem with the property that extracting the complete plaintext of an object ciphertext is computationally equivalent to factoring large numbers 16]. Goldwasser and Micali invented the rst public key cryptosystem that hides all partial information 13]. The cryptosystem is a probabilistic one and it enciphers a plaintext in a bit-by-bit manner. A common drawback of these and many other cryptosystems is that, although secure against chosen plaintext attacks, they are easily compromised by chosen ciphertext attackers. On the other hand, much progress has been made in recent years in the construction of public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. We will review this development, and point out problems and weakness of the proposed schemes.
Theoretical Results
Theoretical study into the construction of public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks was initiated by Blum, Feldman and Micali 1], who suggested the potential applicability of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to the subject. Naor and Yung carried further the study and gave the rst concrete public key cryptosystem that is (semantically) secure against indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks 2]. Racko and Simon considered a m o r e s e v ere type of attack, namely adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, and gave a concrete construction for public key cryptosystems withstanding the attacks 4]. In 3] Dolev, Dwork and Naor proposed a non-malleable (against chosen plaintext attacks) public key cryptosystem and proved that the cryptosystem is also secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
All of these cryptosystems are provably secure under certain assumptions. However since they rely heavily on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, the resulting ciphertexts are in general much longer than original plaintexts. This disadvantage makes the cryptosystems highly impractical and di cult to realize in practice.
Damg ard's Schemes
In 5], Damg ard took a pragmatic approach to the subject. He proposed two simple public key cryptosystems that appear to be secure against indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks. The rst is based on deterministic public key cryptosystems. Let (E 0 D 0 ) be the pair of enciphering and deciphering algorithms of a deterministic public key cryptosystem. Let (pk 1 s k 1 ) and (pk 2 s k 2 ) betwo pairs of public and secret keys and h bean invertible one-to-one length-preserving function. The enciphering algorithm of Damg ard's rst cryptosystem operates in the following way: E(pk 1 p k 2 m ) = (E 0 (pk 1 r ) E 0 (pk 2 h (r)) m) = (c 1 c 2 )
where m 2 n i s a p l a i n text message and r2 R n is a random string. The corresponding deciphering algorithm is as follows: D(sk 1 p k 2 c 1 c 2 ) = E 0 (pk 2 h (D 0 (sk 1 c 1 ))) c 2 Damg ard's second scheme is based on the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal public key cryptosystem 6, 7] , whose security relies on the intractability o f computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. A user Alice's secret key is a pair (x A1 x A2 ) of elements chosen independently at random from 1 p ; 1]. Her public key is (y A1 y A2 ), where y A1 = g x A1 and y A2 = g x A2 . When a user Bob wants to send an n-bit message m in secret to Alice, he sends her the following enciphered message E(y A1 y A2 p g m ) = ( g r y r A1 y r A2 m) = ( c 1 c 2 c 3 )
where r2 R 1 p ; 1] . Note that here n is the length of the prime p. 
Strengthening Public Key Cryptosystems
This section presents three simple methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems against chosen ciphertext attacks. The nature of the three immunization methods is the same | they all immunize a public key cryptosystem by appending to each ciphertext a tag that is correlated to the message to beenciphered. This is also the main technical di erence between our proposals and Damg ard's schemes. The three methods di er in the ways in which tags are generated. In the rst method tags are generated by the use of a one-way hash function, in the second method by the use of a function chosen from a universal class of hash functions, and in the third method by the use of a digital signature scheme. The second immunization method is superior to the other two immunization methods in that no one-way hash functions are needed. This property is particularly attractive given the current state of research, whereby many one-way hash functions exist, few are e cient, and even fewer are provably secure.
We will illustrate our immunization methods with cryptosystems based on the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal public key scheme. In Section 6, applications of the immunization methods to cryptosystems based on other intractable problems will be discussed. Denote by G the cryptographically strong pseudo-random string generator based on the di culty of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds 17, 18, 19] . G stretches an n-bit input string into an output string whose length can be an arbitrary polynomial in n. This generator produces O(log n) bits output at each exponentiation. In the authors' opinion, for practical applications the generator could produce more than 3n 4 bits at each exponentiation, without sacri cing security. Recently Micali and Schnorr discovered a very e cient pseudo-random string generator based on polynomials in the nite eld GF(p) ( produce, for example, n 2 bits with 1:25 multiplications in GF(p). The e ciency of our cryptosystems to be described below can be further improved if Micali and Schnorr's pseudo-random string generator is employed.
A user Alice's secret key is an element x A chosen randomly from 1 p ; 1], and her public key is y A = g x A . It is assumed that all messages to be enciphered are chosen from the set P , where P = P(n) is an arbitrary polynomial with P(n) > = n. Padding can beapplied to messages whose lengths are less than n bits. In addition, let`=`(n) bea polynomial which speci es the length of tags. It is recommended that`should be at least 64 for the sake of security.
Immunizing with One-Way Hash Functions
Assume that h is a one-way hash function compressing input strings into`-bit output strings. A user Bob can use the following enciphering algorithm to send in secret a P-bit message m to Alice. end When messages are of n bits, i.e. P = n, instead of the one-way hash function h the exponentiation function can be used to generate the tag t. In this case, the enciphering algorithm can be modi ed as follows: (a) Change the step 2 to \z = G(y x A ) 1 2n] ." (b) Change the step 3 to \t = g m ." The deciphering algorithm can be modi ed accordingly.
Immunizing with Universal Hash Functions
A class H of functions from P to `i s called a (strongly) universal class of hash functions 21, 22] mapping P-bit input into`-bit output strings if for every x 1 6 = x 2 2 P and every y 1 y 2 2 `, the number of functions in H taking x 1 to y 1 and x 2 to y 2 is #H=2 2`. An equivalent de nition is that when h is chosen uniformly at random from H, the concatenation of the two strings h(x 1 ) and h(x 2 ) is distributed randomly and uniformly over the Cartesian product ` `. Wegman and Carter found a nice application of universal classes of hash functions to unconditionally secure authentication codes 22]. Now assume that H is a universal class of hash functions which map P-bit input into`-bit output strings. Also assume that Q = Q(n) is a polynomial and that each function in H is speci ed by a string of exactly Q bits. Denote by h s the function in H that is speci ed by a string s 2 Q . The enciphering algorithm for Bob who wants to send in secret a P-bit message m to Alice is the following: end Note that the second part c 2 = h s (m) in the ciphertext can be obscured in the same way as Algorithm 1. This would improve practical security of the cryptosystem, at the expense of more computation time spent in generating pseudo-random bits.
The following is a simple universal class of hash functions which is originated from linear congruential generators in nite elds. (See also Propositions 7 and 8 of 21].) Let k bean integer. For k + 1 elements a 1 a 2 : : : a k b 2 GF(2`), let s be their concatenation, i.e., s = a 1 jja 2 j j j j a k jjb, and let h s bethe function de ned by h s (x 1 x 2 : : : x k ) = P k i=1 a i x i + b where x 1 x 2 : : : x k are variables in GF(2`). Then the collection H of the functions h s de ned by all k + 1 elements from GF(2`) is a universal class of hash functions. Functions in H compress k`-bit input into`-bit output strings. By padding to input strings, these functions can beapplied to input strings whose lengths are not exactly k`. In particular, when k = d P e, they can be used to compress P-bit input into`-bit output strings. In this case, a function in H can be speci ed by a string of Q = P + ( 1 + )`bits, where 0 < = = P mod`< 1. This universal class of hash functions is particularly suited to the case where the length P of messages to beenciphered is much larger than the length`of tags. We refer the reader to 22, 23] for other universal classes of hash functions.
Immunizing with Digital Signature Schemes
Assume that h i s a o n e -w ay hash function compressing input strings into n-bit output strings. Also assume that Bob wants to send in secret a P-bit message m to Alice. end Similar to the cryptosystem based on the use of universal hash functions described in Section 4.2, security of the cryptosystem can also be improved by hiding the third part c 3 = (h(m) ; xr)=k mod (p ; 1) with extra pseudo-random bits produced by the pseudo-random string generator G. In addition, when messages to be enciphered are of n bits, neither the one-way hash function h nor the pseudo-random string generator G is necessary. The enciphering algorithm for this case can besimpli ed by c hanging the step 4 of the above enciphering algorithm to \z = r." and the step 7 into \c 3 = (m ; xr)=k mod (p ; 1)." The deciphering algorithm can be simpli ed accordingly.
The rst three parts (c 1 c 2 c 3 ) of the ciphertext represents an adaptation of the ElGamal's digital signature. However, since everyone can generate these parts, they do not really form the digital signature of m. This immunization method was rst proposed in 24], where other ways for generating the third part c 3 in the ciphertext were also suggested.
In Section 5, we will prove that the three cryptosystems are secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks under reasonable assumptions. For convenience, we will denote by C owh the rst cryptosystem which applies one-way hash functions, by C uhf the second cryptosystem which applies universal hash functions and by C sig the third cryptosystem which applies the ElGamal digital signature.
Security of the Cryptosystems
This section is concerned with issues related to security of the three cryptosystems. First we discuss security of the cryptosystems against chosen plaintext attacks. We prove that both C owh and C uhf are secure against chosen plaintext attacks under the Di e-Hellman Assumption to bede ned below. Security of the cryptosystem C sig is also discussed brie y. Then we i n troduce a notion called sole-samplability, and apply the notion in the proofs of security of the cryptosystems against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Security of our cryptosystems rely on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. More speci cally, it relies on the Di e-Hellman Assumption which can beinformally stated as follows: Assumption 1 Given y 1 , y 2 , g and p, where y 1 = g x 1 and y 2 = g x 2 for some x 1 and x 2 chosen randomly and independently from 1 p ; 1], it is computationally infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to compute y = g x 1 x 2 .
Note that an algorithm for computing y = g x 1 (x 2 +x 3 ) from y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , g and p,
where y 1 and y 2 are the same as above, and y 3 = g x 3 for some x 3 2 1 p ; 1], can be used to compute y = g x 1 x 2 from y 1 , y 2 , g and p in the following way: In addition to y 1 , y 2 , g and p, the algorithm is also provided with y 3 = g x 3 , where x 3 is a known element chosen from 1 p ; 1]. Let the output of the algorithm be y. Then we have g x 1 x 2 = y=y x 3 1 . Therefore under the Di e-Hellman Assumption, it is also infeasible to compute y = g x 1 (x 2 +x 3 ) from y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , g and p.
Security against Chosen Plaintext Attacks
Let x 1 x 2 2 R 1 p ; 1], y 1 = g x 1 and y 2 = g x 2 . Let z 1 be a P-bit string taken from the output of the pseudo-random string generator G on input g x 1 x 2 , and z 2 a truly random P-bit string. Then, by an argument similar to that for semantic security o f a public key cryptosystem 25] based on the intractability of factoring large composite numbers, one can show that under the Di e-Hellman Assumption, no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can distinguish between z 1 and z 2 . The algorithm is allowed to have access to p, g, y 1 and y 2 .
It follows from the above result that the cryptosystem C owh is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks. In other words, it leaks no partial information to attackers mounting chosen plaintext attacks. Note that if the t = h(m) part is not enciphered together with m, some partial information on m may beleaked, and the resultant cryptosystem may not besemantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks.
Next we consider the cryptosystem C uhf . For truly random strings z 2 P and s 2 Q , neither z m nor h s (m) leaks any information on m (in the sense of Shannon 15] ), where h s is the hash function speci ed by the string s (see Section 4.2). In addition, when z and s are independent of each other, no information on m is leaked from z m together with h s (m). Now let x 1 x 2 2 R 1 p ; 1], y 1 = g x 1 and y 2 = g x 2 . Let z bethe rst P-bit substring and s bethe next Q-bit substring of the output of the pseudo-random string generator G on input g x 1 x 2 . Then to a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which is allowed to have access to p, g, y 1 and y 2 , the two strings z and s look like independent random strings. Consequently, no partial information on m can be obtained by a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, which is given as input z m, h s (m), p, g, y 1 and y 2 . From this it follows that C uhf is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks.
The above informal arguments for the semantic security of the rst two public key cryptosystems, C owh and C uhf , can be easily translated into formal proofs in a way similar to the proof of security of the cryptosystem proposed in 25]. Thus we have the following result.
Theorem 1 Under the Di e-Hellman Assumption (Assumption 1), both C owh and C uhf , are semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks.
Unlike the previous two cryptosystems, we are not able to prove that the cryptosystem C sig is also semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks. This is mainly caused by the di culty in measuring the amount of information on m leaked by the third part c 3 = ( h(m);xr)=k mod (p;1) in the ciphertext. It is further complicated by the requirement that c 4 = z m also has to betaken into consideration together with c 3 . Nevertheless, when the one-way hash function is carefully chosen so that it behaves like a random function, the cryptosystem apparently leaks no partial information to attackers mounting chosen plaintext attacks.
Security against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
Recall that the output of the enciphering algorithm of the cryptosystem C owh is (c 1 c and Q 1 = Q 1 (n) is a polynomial. We call R = S n R n the space induced by the function f. Informally, w e say that the space R = S n R n is sole-samplable if there is no other way to generate an element y in R n than to pick an element x in D n rst and then to evaluate the function at the point x. To formally de ne sole-samplability, w e need the following two t ypes of Turing machines: sample generators and pre-image extractors.
A sample generator for the space R = S n R n induced by a function f is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine S that, given n as input and access to an oracle O R for the space R, outputs a Q 1 -bit string. The oracle prints in one step a sample string y 2 R n as the answer to a request n 2 IN. S can query the oracle only by writing n 2 IN on a special tape and will read the oracle answer y 2 R n on a separate answer-tape.
A pre-image extractor of a sample generator S is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine X that has complete access to the contents of S's tapes and can observe thoroughly the entire computation of S. The input of X is an integer n 2 IN and the output of X is an n-bit string. De nition 2 Let f be a function from D = S n D n to R = S n R n , where D n n , R n Q 1 and Q 1 = Q 1 (n) is a polynomial. The space R = S n R n induced by the function f is sole-samplable if for any sample generator S and for any polynomial Q 2 = Q 2 (n), there i s a p r e-image extractor X of the sample generator S such that for all su ciently large n, PrfX (1 n S)g > = 1 ; 1=Q 2 where PrfX (1 n S)g is the probability that, when the output of S is a sample y from R n that is di erent from those given by an oracle O R , X outputs a string x 2 D n such that y = f(x).
Note that when a function f is not one-way, that is, the inverse function f ;1 of f is computable in probabilistic polynomial time, the space R induced by f is trivially sole-samplable, as one can always compute the pre-image x 2 D n of an element y 2 R n , which implies that there is essentially only one way to sample R n , namely, picking x rst and then computing y = f(x). In this paper we are only interested in spaces induced by one-way functions.
A necessary condition for the space R = S n R n induced by a one-way function f to be sole-sample is that R besparse. That is, #R n =2 Q 1 < 1=Q 2 for any polynomial Q 2 = Q 2 (n) and for all su ciently large n. Otherwise, if R is non-sparse, one can always generate with a high probability a sample of R n simply by ipping Q 1 coins. However, sparseness is not a su cient condition for sole-samplability. As an example, consider the space induced by the one-way function f(x) = f 0 (x)jjf 0 (x), where f 0 is a one-way permutation on S n n . Although the space is sparse (as we have R n =2 2n = 2 n =2 2n = 1=2 n < 1=Q 2 for any polynomial Q 2 = Q 2 (n) and for all su ciently large n), a sample y = y 0 jjy 0 2 2n can be readily obtained by ipping n coins. It is an interesting subject for future research to investigate other conditions for the space induced by a one-way function to be sole-samplable.
We will use the following assumptions in the proofs of security of the three cryptosystems. The assumptions are concerned with the sole-samplability of the spaces induced by the functions de ned by the enciphering algorithms of the cryptosystems. These assumption are apparently reasonable thanks to the involvement of a tag in the generation of the ciphertext of a plaintext message. For the sake of simplicity, \the space induced by the functions de ned by the enciphering algorithm" will be called \the space induced by the enciphering algorithm".
Assumption 2 The space induced by the enciphering algorithm of the cryptosystem C owh is sole-samplable. Assumption 3 The space induced by the enciphering algorithm of the cryptosystem C uhf is sole-samplable. Assumption 4 The space induced by the enciphering algorithm of the cryptosystem C sig is sole-samplable.
We say that two assumptions A1 and A2 are comparable if either A1 implies A2 or A2 implies A1. Otherwise we say that A1 and A2 are incomparable. Examples of comparable assumptions are the Di e-Hellman Assumption (Assumption 1) and the assumption that discrete logarithms over large nite elds are intractable. They are comparable as the former implies the latter. Now w e consider the Di e-Hellman Assumption and Assumption 2 (Assumptions 3 and 4, respectively). Note that Assumption 2 (Assumptions 3 and 4, respectively) holds even if the Di e-Hellman Assumption does not hold. The former may hold if the latter does hold. Therefore Assumption 2 (Assumptions 3 and 4, respectively) may hold regardless of the Di e-Hellman Assumption. In other words, Assumption 2 (Assumptions 3 and 4, respectively) and the Di e-Hellman Assumption may be incomparable. It is worthwhile to investigate the exact relations among the assumptions.
The following theorem reveals the relevance of sole-samplability to security of cryptosystems.
Theorem 2 Assume that the space induced by the enciphering algorithm of a public key cryptosystem is sole-samplable. Then the cryptosystem is semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks if and only if it is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks.
Proof.
The \only if" part is trivially true. Now we prove the \if" part by showing that for a public key cryptosystem whose enciphering algorithm induces a sole-samplable space, an adaptively chosen ciphertext attacker can do no better than a chosen plaintext attacker. Thus security of the cryptosystem against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks is reduced to its security against chosen plaintext attacks. Putting the above discussions together, we k n o w that an adaptively chosen ciphertext attacker (L acc T acc ) can becompletely simulated by a chosen plaintext attacker (L cp T cp ). From this it follows immediately that the \if" part is true, i.e., the cryptosystem is semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks if it is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks. u t Theorem 2 is interesting in that it not only relates sole-samplability to security of a cryptosystem, but also suggests an approach to the construction of public key cryptosystems that attain security against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
By Theorems 1 and 2, our rst two cryptosystems, C owh and C uhf , are both semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, under Assumptions 2 and 3, respectively, and the Di e-Hellman Assumption. As discussed at the end of Section 5.1, we are not able to prove semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks of the cryptosystem C sig under the Di e-Hellman Assumption. In order to prove semantic security against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks of C sig , w e have to use an assumption stronger than the Di e-Hellman Assumption, namely, that C sig is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks. These discussions lead to the following theorem: Theorem 3 The three cryptosystems, C owh , C uhf and C sig , a r e all semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, under (1) Assumption 2 and the Di eHellman Assumption, (2) Assumption 3 and the Di e-Hellman Assumption, and (3) Assumption 4 and the assumption that it is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks, respectively.
Extensions of the Cryptosystems
We have focused our attention on cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem in nite elds. The cryptosystems can also bebased on discrete logarithms over other kinds of nite abelian groups, such as those on elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves de ned over nite elds 26, 27] . Another variant of the cryptosystems is to have a di erent large prime for each user. This variant can greatly improve practical security of the cryptosystems when a large numberof users are involved.
Our rst two methods for immunization, namely immunization with one-way hash functions and immunization with universal hash functions, can beapplied to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems. For example, the methods can beused to immunize the probabilistic public key cryptosystem proposed in 25], which is based on the intractability of factoring large composite numbers. The methods might be extended further in such a way that allows us to construct from any trap-door one-way function a public key cryptosystem secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
Authentication is another important aspect of information security. In many situations, the receiver of a message needs to be assured that the received message is truly originated from its sender and that it has not been tampered with during its transmission. Researchers have proposed many, unconditionally or computationally, secure methods for information authentication 28]. We take the cryptosystem C uhf as an example to show that our cryptosystems can be easily enhanced with information authentication capability.
To do so, it is required that the sender Bob also has a pair (y B x B ) of public and secret keys. Information authentication is achieved by letting Bob's secret key x B be involved in the creation of a ciphertext. More speci cally, w e c hange the step 2 of the enciphering Algorithm 3 to \r = y x B +x A ." and the step 1 of the corresponding deciphering Algorithm 4 to \r 0 = ( y B c 1 ) x A ." Although ciphertexts from Alice to Bob are indistinguishable from those from Bob to Alice, it is infeasible for a user di ering from Alice and Bob to create a \legal" ciphertext from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice. This property ensures information authentication capability of the cryptosystem. From the observation following the de nition of the Di e-Hellman Assumption (Assumption 1), we know that computing g x 1 (x 2 +x 3 ) from g x 1 , g x 2 and g x 3 , and computing g x 1 x 2 from g x 1 and g x 2 , are equally di cult. Therefore the authentication-enhanced cryptosystem is as secure as the original one.
The cryptosystem C owh can be enhanced with information authentication capability in a similar way. For the cryptosystem C sig , the capability can be added by simply replacing x, a random string chosen from 1 p ; 1], with Bob's secret key x B .
Conclusions
We have presented three methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems against chosen ciphertext attacks, among which the second immunization method based on the use of universal hash functions is particularly attractive in that no one-way hash functions are needed. Each immunization method is illustrated by an example of a public key cryptosystem based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. The notion of sole-samplability has been formally de ned, and an interesting relation between sole-samplability and security of cryptosystems has been revealed. This relation has been further applied in the formal proofs of security of the example public key cryptosystems. The generality of our immunization methods is shown by their applicability to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems, such as that of factoring large composite numbers. An enhancement of information authentication capability to the example cryptosystems has also been suggested.
